partitions the probability space. Classical conditionalization is Jeffrey conditionalization on an evidence partition consisting of just one proposition and its negation, with associated probabilities 1 and 0.
It is well known that classical conditionalization is irreversible, in the sense that no learning episode can be undone by any subsequent applications of the classical rule. There are, however, occasions on which the agent will want to undo a present commitment and revert to an earlier belief state. Such change lies beyond the purview of classical Bayesianism. For one thing, it requires that the agent keep a detailed record of earlier beliefs, which is not a standard Bayesian requirement.
Secondly, it is a change that cannot be accomplished by conditionalization. Jeffrey conditionalization appears to obviate the need for this sort of change. For as long as no contingent proposition receives probability extremes 0 or 1, the effect of any update by Jeffrey's rule can be undone by subsequent applications of the same rule.
As I hope to show, this fact does not obviate the need for a different form of belief change after all.
The outcome of a sequence of updates by Jeffrey conditionalization depends on the order in which the updating steps are carried out. Jeffrey pointed this out early on but didn't make much of it. Others began to worry, until Hartry Field (1978) showed how to reconceptualize the input into Jeffrey's rule in such a way as to make the order effect disappear. But Field's remedy, I will argue, is ineffective. The reason is that he assigns experience a role for which it is simply unsuited. This leaves us with Jeffrey's rule in its original form. Its order effect is serious enough to call for an occasional adjustment of beliefs that is not conditionalization on the evidence. Consequently, the rule provides at best a partial account of rational belief change.
Jeffrey never defended his rule as a complete account, nor am I aware of such a defense for the classical rule. But the fact that alternative approaches to belief change have had very little impact on Bayesian thinking suggests to me that there is too much complacency in the Bayesians community as regards the scope of its favorite accounts.
Classical Conditionalization.
That classical conditionalization cannot be a complete account of rational belief change is widely appreciated. I shall therefore only briefly rehearse the case here. A classical Bayesian agent learns from experience by trading in a prior probability function p for a posterior function p e such that, for every proposition x in the common domain of p and p e , p e (x) = p(x|e), where e is a proposition that captures the deliverance of experience and p(e) ≠ 0. The restriction to positive p(e) follows from the standard definition of conditional probability as a ratio of unconditional probabilities: the relevant conditional probabilities p(x|e) = def p(x & e)/p(e) are defined only for positive p(e). The change sets p e (e) to 1 since p(e|e) = 1, that is, in the new probability function, the evidence is accepted as certain.
Changes by conditionalization are irreversible in two respects. First, no subsequent change by conditionalization can undo the effect of an earlier learning episode. The reason is that evidence accepted in the past will always retain probability 1 since, whenever p(e 1 ) = 1 and p(e 2 ) ≠ 0, we have p(e 1 & e 2 )/p(e 2 ) = that the agent's probability space gets carved up into disjoint regions corresponding to the cells of the partition, and then each of these regions is enlarged or shrunk independently of the others, subject to two provisos: that the regions' joint probability after the change equal 1 (normalization), and that all probability ratios within each region -the p(x|e)/p(y|e) -be left intact (rigidity). We may think of each region as the surface of a balloon that is being inflated or deflated. The ratio between any two areas on a balloon's surface is unaffected by inflation or deflation.
It is clear that, as long as no balloons are popped (no cell receives probability 0), such change is reversible. In classical conditionalization, by contrast, one of the balloons takes over while its complement vanishes. In the sequel, I will focus on the simplest case of Jeffrey conditionalization, in which the evidence partition for each learning episode consists of just two cells, representing one evidence proposition and its negation.
Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence comes in. This means that the probability function that results from first assigning some probability value r 1 to e 1 (and thus 1 -r 1 to ¬e 1 ) and then probability r 2 to e 2 may differ from the function that results from first assigning r 2 to e 2 and subsequently assigning r 1 to e 1 . Jeffrey notes this order dependence in passing as a curious but perfectly sensible feature of his scheme. The effect can, however, be quite dramatic and unreasonable, as the following schematic example shows. Let the agent's initial probability function be partially described by the following assignment:
Probabilities for all truth functions of A and B are thereby determined. In particular, p(A _ B) = p(AB) + p(¬AB) + p(A¬B) = .55. We shall now compare two updating sequences. In the first sequence, experience initially raises the probability of A _ B to 0.99 (thus lowering the probability of ¬A¬B to 0.01) and subsequently raises the probability of ¬A _ B to 0.99; in the second sequence these events occur in reverse order. According to Jeffrey's rule, raising the probability of A _ B to .99 has the following effect on the probability of AB: Figure 1
Probabilities are given here as percentages. The thick black line in each table divides the two cells of the evidence partition that underlies the change to the assignment depicted by that table. Focus on the bottom rows in the two rightmost tables. At the end of the first updating sequence, the probability of A¬B is one fifth of the probability of ¬A¬B; at the end of the second updating sequence it is the other way round. Equivalently, the probability of A given ¬B is 1/6 after sequence 1 and 5/6 after sequence 2. By playing with the numbers, this discrepancy can be brought as close to 1 as you please. If this doesn't seem dramatic enough yet, imagine a third updating step in which the probability of B is lowered close to 0. This would force the unconditional probabilities for A and ¬A near 0 and 1, with the roles of A and ¬A reversed in the two sequences. This seems wholly unjustified if there is nothing essential about the order in which experiences were made. What we would like to see is a symmetrical final state, one in which A¬B and ¬A¬B receive about the same probability.
We .
It follows that if the two updating sequences in Figure 1 are viewed as the effects of classical conditionalization in a richer probability space, then the pair of evidence propositions for the first sequence must be different from the pair of evidence propositions for the second sequence. The difference will consist, presumably, in some reference to the order in which the evidence arrived. But intuitively, I think, this is a difference that shouldn't make a difference.
The order effect is an embarrassment against which a rational agent will want to safeguard. This requires, in the first place, a memory of previous belief states enabling the agent to notice the effect. I see no problem endowing the agent with such a faculty. The memory will be of obvious use in counteracting the effect. The most straightforward approach would be to revert to the original probabilities and try to assimilate the later evidence all at once. There is no unique recipe for this.
The easiest solution in the case at hand is to merge the two updating steps into one by compounding their constraints (the respective posteriors). This requires that the constraints be compatible, which, in this case, they are. The new assignment to accomodate would be: p(A¬B) = p(¬A¬B) = 0.01. In order to apply Jeffrey's rule, we need an evidence partition. We can easily construct one by complementing the two propositions whose probabilities were directly affected, so that the change now There are many alternatives to this solution. One is to fuse the two pieces of evidence together using a rule first proposed by Arthur Dempster, and subsequently Jeffrey-conditionalize on the new evidence probabilities. In the present example, this will generate practically the same result as the first procedure. In general, however, the two procedures are not equivalent. Nor are they universally applicable.
Since a detailed discussion of Dempster's rule would take us too far afield, I
offer only a brief hint for the cognoscienti, based on Shafer (1976) . The "frame of should do. He points out that the logarithm of the change factor is 0 when there is no change in odds and suggests that 0 is the right value to represent an "uninformative" episode of sensory stimulation. The problem with this suggestion is that informativeness is clearly relative to agents' beliefs. For example, whether the sound of the ambulance siren is informative for me depends on whether I already noticed the ambulance car. The input parameter, by contrast, should be belief independent, as Field insists elsewhere in his paper. It "represents the effects that the sensory stimulation has by itself (independently of the value of p [the agent's prior probability function])" (Field 1978, p. 363 ). Yet reasonable change in odds is clearly not belief independent. Consider Jeffrey's sort of example. A piece of cloth looks bluish green under neon lights. How should the observation affect your probability (or odds) for the cloth's being blue? It clearly depends. If your prior for blue was very low, you should move to a higher posterior; if your prior was very high, you should move to a lower posterior. The magnitude and even the direction of the change depends on your priors. Yet if the observation issued Field's factor α, the direction of change would have to be the same in either case. Since this would be wrong, the observation had better not issue α.
To say that the input factor cannot be an odds-change factor is one thing; to say that it is a posterior probability is another. For Field, the factor cannot be a posterior probability because posteriors are dependent on priors, not just on the evidence: "it is clear that the probability q which I attach to an observation sentence E after I have been subjected to a sensory stimulation will depend not only on the sensory stimulation but also on the probability I attached to E before the exhausted by the change it effects in the agent's probability function at the time at which it arrives. There is no prevision in the model for an assessment of the joint impact of pieces of evidence that arrived at different times. Yet it is exactly this sort of considered "look back" that would support the preferred symmetric solution in the example, one where there is no (or no significant) discrepancy in the probabilities for A¬B and ¬A¬B.
Incremental updating is rational insofar as it minimizes change in belief at each step in the learning process (probabilities conditional upon the evidence remaining fixed). Yet, as we saw, locally minimal changes can add up to a change that violates more global constraints of minimality or symmetry. The Bayesian procedures for incremental belief change thus fail to serve globally the very same ideal of rationality they serve locally. For the purpose of globally (or less locally) minimal change, procedures of a different sort are required. In a more complete account, the incremental updating schemes will have to be supplemented with non-incremental schemes. Naturally, demanding such supplementation is one thing, providing it is quite another. I suspect that the same need for supplementation arises for non-Bayesian schemes of belief management, but I cannot argue this point here because the schemes in question are not yet sufficiently developed to determine sequences of belief revision. In the currently most developed approach to the revision of beliefs as represented by sets of accepted sentences or propositions, the Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson approach, no revision rules have been specified that would allow iterated revision. The problem is that the rules that have been proposed exploit some parameter like epistemic entrenchment that is external to the representation of belief, and it is unclear how this parameter should be adjusted when beliefs are revised.
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